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Abstract
The main objective of this research paper is to examine the impact of board size and 
ownership concentration, representing corporate governance mechanisms, on 
agency costs in large Croatian companies. Furthermore, debt financing and firm 
growth are examined because those variables also have impact on agency costs. 
Agency theory defines a framework for the potential issue of the separation of 
ownership and management as well as for the conflict between stakeholders 
(principals) and managers (agents). The most significant principal-agent problems 
are agency costs, but they do not have a directly quantifiable value; hence, in this 
research paper, the asset turnover ratio is used as the approximation. Therefore, this 
research will empirically test the significance of the impact of board size, ownership 
concentration, debt financing and firm growth on agency cost in the observed period 
from 2014 to 2018 using panel data analysis. This research was conducted with 
large Croatian companies using data and information from official annual accounts 
primarily to ensure objectivity, standardization and comparability. Specifically, the 
analysis was conducted on 219 companies operating in two main categories of 
economic activity: Manufacturing (C) and Wholesale and retail trade (G). The 
results indicate that board size has a significant but negative impact on agency costs. 
The results also indicate that debt and growth have a significant and negative impact 
on agency costs. Ownership concentration was not found to have significant impact.
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1. Introduction
Aziz et al. (2015) claim that corporate governance explains processes and structures 
that are used for management within the company and that the aim of these practices 
is to increase the wealth of shareholders. According to this definition, corporate 
governance mechanisms aim to resolve agency problems and to protect the wealth of 
shareholders. Panda and Leepsa (2017) state that the agency problem began with the 
development of joint-stock companies but that organizations suffer from this problem 
in different forms. La Porta et al. (2000: 3) state that the agency problem is a situation 
in which “the insiders who control corporate assets can use these assets for a range 
of purposes that are detrimental to the interests of the outside investors”. Bhojraj and 
Sengupta (2003: 456) state that the agency problem is “a risk that management acting 
in its self-interest would take actions that deviate from firm value maximization, as 
well as the risk that the manager is incompetent”. Jensen and Meckling (1976) define 
a principal-agent relationship as a contract between the principal and the agent under 
which the principal engages the agent to perform services on their behalf. Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) argue that it is impossible with zero agency costs to ensure that the 
agent will make optimal decisions for the principal. 
Eisenhardt (1989) states that the domain of agency theory is the relationship of the 
principal and the agent who are engaged in a principal-agent contract and who have 
different goals and attitudes towards risk. According to Florackis (2008), agency 
theory provides a unique, realistic, and empirically testable perspective on problems 
between the principal and the agent. Consequently, agency costs associated with 
the agency problem cannot be avoided if a principal hires an agent to manage 
companies. Bendickson et al. (2016) define two perspectives in agency theory: 
principal-agent research and positivist agency theory. Eisenhardt (1989: 59) states 
that these two perspectives “share a common unit of analysis: the contract between 
the principal and the agent” as well as assumptions about people, organizations, 
and information. According to Bendickson et al. (2016) the first perspective, 
principal-agent research identifies two possible agency problems: risk-sharing 
and agent monitoring. Eisenhardt (1989) claims that positivist agency theory is 
focused on identifying situations in which the principal and the agent have different 
goals and describes the governance mechanisms that limit the agent’s self-serving 
behaviour. Cerović et al. (2011) state that agency costs are all of those tangible and 
intangible assets which the principal uses in the control of agent to ensure optimal 
capital exploitation. The main idea of this paper is to analyse the efficiency of the 
governance mechanisms that limit those agent behaviours which are in conflict with 
the principal’s interest. Based on literature review and results of past studies the 
paper’s hypotheses are as follows:
H1: Agency costs will be lower when companies have boards that are small in size.
H2: When the ownership concentration is greater, agency costs will be lower.
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The basis of this research paper is the theoretical and empirical literature in agency 
theory. The primary research questions are (1) what is the relationship between the 
size of the supervisory board and the asset turnover ratio (level of agency costs) and 
(2) what is the relationship between ownership concentration and the asset turnover 
ratio (level of agency costs) in the Croatian capital market?
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 is the literature review on theories and 
studies in the field of corporate governance mechanism. Section 3 is description of 
methodology of analysis. Econometric model is establishment in section 4. Section 
5 discusses the empirical results. Section 6 summarizes conclusion, study limitation 
and recommendations for future research.
2. Literature review
Agency costs, as the most significant principal-agent problem, do not have a 
directly quantifiable value. Several authors in their empirical studies define 
measures for the approximation of agency costs. Cerović et al. (2011), Florackis 
(2008), Junwei et al. (2011), Fauzi and Locke (2012), Ang et al. (2000), Singh and 
Davidson (2003), Gul et al. (2012), Rashid (2016), Garanina and Kaikova (2016), 
McKnight and Weir (2009) and Aziz et al. (2015) define total asset turnover as a 
proxy for agency costs. According to Junwei et al. (2011), McKnight and Weir 
(2009) and Ang et al. (2000), lower total assets turnover indicates a higher level 
of agency costs because of inefficient asset utilization. Inefficient asset utilization 
decreases the wealth of shareholders. Panda and Leepsa (2017) state that total assets 
turnover explains the efficiency with which the assets are utilized by management 
and that better utilization indicates lower agency cost. Aziz et al. (2015) claim that 
increased firm performance decreases agency costs. Junwei et al. (2011) and Aziz 
et al. (2015) define several governance mechanisms for controlling agency costs: 
board size, debt financing, and ownership concentration. 
2.1. Board size
Junwei et al. (2011), Fauzi and Locke (2012) and Florackis (2008) state that a 
large board is usually more powerful than a small board and obtains better results 
or that, when board size is larger, agency costs are lower. Fauzi and Locke (2012) 
also claim that larger companies tend to have larger agency costs and that larger 
board sizes can reduce agency costs. In contrast, empirical evidence of Junwei et 
al. (2011) indicates that board size is indistinctively correlated with asset turnover; 
moreover, they claim that companies with larger board sizes are less efficient in 
their asset utilization, or that they have higher agency costs. Furthermore, Aziz 
et al. (2015) and Garanina and Kaikova (2016) state that companies with smaller 
boards have lower agency costs. Huyghebaert and Wang (2012) claim that, when 
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the size of the board increases, the board loses some ability to exert control over 
key business decisions and the power to ensure that the interests of all investors 
are realized. Gul et al. (2012) indicate a negative association between board size 
and the asset utilization ratio; therefore, they indicate that companies with smaller 
board sizes have lower agency costs. Singh and Davidson (2003) state that board 
size is negatively related to asset turnover and claim that a larger board size is 
associated with efficiency losses. Florackis and Ozkan (2004) state that the size of 
the board has a negative influence on agency costs in terms of asset turnover, which 
means that, when the board size is larger, agency costs will be higher. Research 
results conducted by Aziz et al. (2015) on Pakistani companies show a significantly 
negative relationship with asset turnover because of less effective boards. Garanina 
and Kaikova (2016) indicate in research conducted on Norwegian, Russian and 
US companies—that larger boards are associated with higher agency costs in 
companies. Guney et al. (2020) indicate that a larger board size has an adverse 
impact on the operational performance of companies. Huu Nguyen et al. (2020) 
claim that the majority of studies in UK and US indicated a negative relation 
between board size and firm performance, which imply the higher level of agency 
costs in companies with larger boards. Previous empirical studies indicated the 
negative impact of board size on agency costs, so this was the background for our 
first hypothesis. We are expecting a negative impact of board size on agency costs 
in Croatian companies.
2.2. Ownership concentration
According to Florackis (2008), shareholders with substantial stakes have a greater 
incentive to supervise management and can do so more effectively than those 
without substantial stakes, which indicates that higher ownership concentration 
results in lower agency costs. Aziz et al. (2015) claim that, when the ownership 
concentration is greater, agency costs are lower. Additionally, Moez (2018) claims 
that ownership concentration has a negative impact on agency costs. Junwei et al. 
(2011) state that, when the sum of the stakes of the top ten shareholders is larger, 
agency costs are lower. Sanda et al. (2010) claim that the effect of ownership 
concentration is positive on firm performance (return on asset). The results of a 
study performed by Ang et al. (2000) indicate that agency costs are higher when 
an agent (outsider) manages the company and that agency costs decrease when the 
ownership is more concentrated. In contrast, Junwei et al. (2011) indicate a not 
significant relationship between the sum of the stakes of the top ten shareholders 
and asset turnover. Aziz et al. (2015) indicate a negative but also insignificant 
relationship between asset turnover and ownership concentration. Shan and McIver 
(2011) claim that high levels of ownership concentration will have a negative 
impact on firm performance because of a conflict between majority and minority 
shareholders and show research results in support of this conclusion. Moez (2018) 
ownership concentration has a negative impact on agency costs.
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2.3. Debt financing
Jensen and Meckling (1976) explain that debt financing decreases agency costs 
and increases company value. Florackis (2008: 40) argues that “bank debt has an 
advantage in comparison to publicly traded debt in monitoring a firm’s activities 
and in collecting and processing information”. In addition, Garanina and Kaikova 
(2016) state that companies with a higher level of debt are better monitored by 
creditors, resulting in lower agency costs. Junwei et al. (2011), McKnight and 
Weir (2009) and Fauzi and Locke (2012) state that, when the ratio of total debt to 
total assets is greater, agency costs are lower. According to Rashid (2016), when a 
firm relies on debt financing, the interest payment obligation may reduce agency 
costs. Junwei et al. (2011) claim that the ratio of total debt to total assets is positive. 
Empirical evidence found by Zhang and Li (2008) supports the thesis that higher 
leverage can reduce agency costs. McKnight and Weir (2009) indicate that debt is 
positive and statistically significant, suggesting that companies with more debt tend 
to have lower agency costs. Ang et al. (2000) state that additional debt decreases 
agency costs. In contrast, Singh and Davidson (2003) state that leverage is 
negatively related to the asset turnover ratio. Garanina and Kaikova (2016) indicate 
that, in US companies, higher debt is associated with lower agency costs, but, in 
Norwegian companies, higher debt increases agency costs. These results clearly 
show the different impact which some corporate governance mechanisms have on 
agency costs depending on market characteristics. 
2.4. Firm growth
Mendoza and Yelpo (2016) claim that companies with low growth opportunities 
have a greater possibility of incurring high agency costs when a greater degree of 
separation exists between ownership and corporate control. Rashid (2016: 614) 
claim that “growing firms may also achieve economies of scale; this may contribute 
substantially to reducing their agency cost”. Florackis (2008) states that corporate 
governance mechanisms are expected to be more effective for high-growth firms. 
The results according to Florackis (2008) support the thesis that the relationship 
between different governance mechanisms and agency costs is not homogeneous 
but varies with growth opportunities. In contrast to his claim, his empirical 
evidence indicated that high-growth firms have lower asset turnover ratios, possibly 
because of extensive information asymmetries between managers, shareholders and 
debtholders in high-growth firms.
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3. Methodology of analysis
3.1. Variable measurement, data analysis and results
Agency costs are not directly measurable, so, in this analysis, an approximation 
measure was used: asset turnover. Therefore, we used the approximation measure 
that was used by Cerović et al. (2011), Florackis (2008), Junwei et al. (2011), Fauzi 
(2012), Ang et al. (2000), Singh and Davidson (2003), Gul et al. (2012), Rashid 
(2016) and Panda and Leepsa (2017) in their studies. These authors claim that a 
higher assets turnover indicates lower agency costs. 
Dependent variable of the analysis:
1.  AGENCYCOSTSi,t – agency costs of company i in year t, measured as the total 
annual income divided by total assets (asset turnover). The data for assets 
turnover were collected from database INFOBIZZ.
Independent variables, including control variables, for the analysis:
2. BOARD SIZEi,t – board size of company i in year t, measured as the total 
number of supervisory board members. The data were collected from database 
INFOBIZZ.
3. OWNERSHIP CONCENTRATIONi,t – ownership concentration of company i in 
year t, measured as sum of percentage shares of the top ten shareholders. The 
data were collected from database INFOBIZZ, company web sites, and other 
similar sources on the internet.
4. DEBTi,t – debt of company i in year t, measured as the total debt divided by the 
total assets. The data were collected from database INFOBIZZ. Control variable.
5. GROWTHi,t – growth of company i in year t, measured as a percentage increase 
in sales revenue compared to the previous year. The data were collected from 
database INFOBIZZ. Control variable.
We conducted a static panel data analysis to test the effects of the corporate 
governance mechanisms on the agency costs proxies for our panel data sample. The 
research model is the following:
AGENCYCOSTSi,t = αi + β1 BOARDSIZEi,t + β2 OWNERSHIPCONCENTRATIONi,t 
 + β3 DEBTi,t + β4 GROWTHi,t + εi,t
i = 1,…,109; t = 1,…,5
where:
i – number of observation units,
t – number of observation periods,
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αi – overall intercept term, 
εi,t  – the observation error for ith units in time t, and
β1.., β4 – beta coefficients.
To test whether the fixed-effects model is more suitable than the combined model, 
the F-test will be applied, which tests the null hypothesis of the equality of constant 
members for all spatial units of observation, and, if the null hypothesis cannot be 
rejected, the model with fixed effects is not appropriate (Wooldridge, 2002; Baltagi 
2009; Bahovec and Erjavec, 2009; Skrabić Perić, 2012). The Lagrange Multiplier 
test (LM) was conducted, in which the null hypothesis assumes that the variance 
of the random effect of observation units is equal to zero, thus examining the 
justification of using the random-effect model compared to other models (Breusch-
Pagan test). If the null hypothesis is accepted, the random-effect model is suitable 
for estimating the parameters in relation to the combined model (Wooldridge, 2002; 
Baltagi 2009; Bahovec and Erjavec, 2009; Skrabić Perić, 2012). If two diagnostic 
tests (F-test, LM test) indicate that the combined model is not suitable for 
estimating parameters, the Hausman specification test will be performed comparing 
the estimated coefficients of the fixed- and random-effect models. The Hausman 
specification test examines the null hypothesis, which assumes that both estimators 
are consistent but that the parameter estimates obtained from the random-effects 
model are effective, and, if the null hypothesis cannot be rejected, the random-
effects model is more appropriate (Wooldridge, 2002; Baltagi 2009; Bahovec and 
Erjavec, 2009; Skrabić Perić, 2012). 
4. Empirical data and results
4.1. Sample and data collection
The research was conducted with large Croatian companies that operate in two 
main categories of economic activity: Manufacturing (C) and Wholesale and retail 
trade (G). The total number of companies in these categories according to Financial 
Agency (cro. FINA) was 219, but, for some companies, the data for the observed 
period, 2014–2018, were not accessible, so those companies were excluded from 
further observation. The following companies were excluded from the defined 
sample: companies that did not have supervisory boards, companies that did not 
operate continuously in the defined period, companies that were in bankruptcy, 
companies which operate as limited partnerships and companies that did not 
have supervisory boards continuously in the defined period (2014–2018). The 
final sample includes 109 large companies. The board structure in the examined 
companies is the two-tier (Continental type) model. The observed period is defined 
according to the available data.
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The research includes an analysis of the company’s basic financial statements 
(balance sheet as well as the profit and loss statement) available in the official data 
from the Statistical Base and the Public Announcement Report of the Financial 
Agency (cro. FINA). Secondary data were used for the analysis. To obtain financial 
indicators (assets turnover, firm growth, and debt financing), data were used from 
the unconsolidated financial statement of companies from 2014 to 2018, accessible 
in the Financial Agency database (INFOBIZZ). Information about board size was 
accessible in the Financial Agency database. To obtain ownership concentration, 
information was used from company web sites, yearbooks and other similar sources 
on the internet. The aim of this research was to examine the impact of board size 
and ownership concentration on the level of agency costs according to existing 
research conducted by Florackis (2008), Junwei et al. (2011), Fauzi (2012), Ang et 
al. (2000), Singh and Davidson (2003), Gul et al. (2012) and Rashid (2016). 
Based on the defined aim of this paper, two research questions were identified:
RQ1: What is the relationship between the size of the supervisory board and the 
asset turnover ratio (level of agency costs) in the Croatian capital market?
RQ2: What is the relationship between ownership concentration and the asset 
turnover ratio (level of agency costs) in the Croatian capital market?
According to the literature and past study results, the paper’s hypotheses are as 
follows:
H1: Agency costs will be lower when companies have boards that are small in size.
H2: When the ownership concentration is greater, agency costs will be lower.













 Mean  1.368294  0.540514  0.104654  0.949249  4.355963
 Median  1.080000  0.490000  0.041184  1.000000  4.000000
 Maximum  5.720000  3.020000  19.18736  1.000000  9.000000
 Minimum  0.060000  0.050000 -0.900381  0.000000  2.000000
 Std. Dev.  0.924811  0.313155  1.061647  0.140963  1.453282
 Skewness  1.540875  2.598789  15.95420 -4.088231  0.819128
 Kurtosis  5.543204  17.29294  267.1232  22.81004  3.328492
Source: Authors´calculations
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Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics for the variables included in the analysis. 
Agency costs ranged between 0.06 and 5.72. The maximum of this variable is 5.72, 
indicated the company with the lowest agency costs. Board size ranged between 
2 and 9, and ownership concentration ranged between 0.0 and 1.0. The median of 
ownership concentration is 1, which indicates that 50% of the examined companies 
have a high level of ownership concentration. Debt ranged between 0.05 and 3.02, 
and growth, between -0,9 and 19.18. The mean of board size is 4.35. The mean of 
ownership concentration is 0.94 which indicates a high ownership concentration in 
the sample. 
To define the appropriateness of the fixed- or random-effects regressions in the 
sample, diagnostic tests were done. The F-test, LM test and the Hausman test were 
conducted. The F-test indicated that the fixed-effects model is appropriate, while the 
LM test indicated the appropriateness of the random-effect model. The Hausman 
test indicated that the random-effects model is appropriate in our sample of panel 
data. A random-effects multivariate regression was conducted for companies from 
2014–2018 to examine the impact of the selected corporate governance mechanisms 
(board size and ownership concentration) on agency costs.
Table 2: Panel data – results of analysis
Dependent variable
AGENCYCOSTS (Asset turnover ratio) Coefficient Prob. 
Independent variable
Intercept 1.344115 0.0013






Lagrange Multiplier test 0.000
Selected model Random effects
Total observations 545
*significant at the 5% level; **significant at the 10% level
Source: Authors´calculations
The results of the analysis (Table 2) indicated a significant and negative relationship 
between BOARDSIZE and ASSET TURNOVER at the 10% level, which means 
that agency costs are lower when the board size is smaller. DEBT also exhibited a 
significant and negative relationship with the asset turnover ratio at the 5% level, 
Marina Klačmer Čalopa, Ivana Đunđek Kokotec, Karolina Kokot • Impact of board size... 
530 Zb. rad. Ekon. fak. Rij. • 2020 • vol. 38 • no. 2 • 521-535
which means that, at the lower debt level, asset turnover will be higher and agency 
cost will be lower. GROWTH has a significant and negative relationship with 
ASSET TURNOVER at the 5% level. This relationship indicates that companies 
with lower growth will have lower agency costs. The results also indicated a 
positive but insignificant relationship between OWNERSHIP CONCENTRATION 
and ASSET TURNOVER. 
5. Results and discussion
The results of the analysis indicated that the paper’s hypotheses are partially 
supported. Between board size and asset turnover ratio is indicated significant and 
negative relationship, which means that agency costs are lower when the board 
size is smaller. Thus, hypothesis 1 is supported, because companies with a smaller 
board size will have lower agency costs. These results are in line with Gul et al. 
(2012), Florackis and Ozkan (2004), Singh and Davidson (2003) and Aziz et al. 
(2015), which also indicated the negative relationship between board size and asset 
turnover and which claim that, when the board size is larger, agency costs will be 
higher. This finding could be interpreted to mean that larger boards will result in 
higher agency costs because such boards are less effective (Aziz et al., 2015). Debt 
also exhibited a significant and negative relationship with the asset turnover ratio, 
which means that, at the lower debt level, asset turnover ratio will be higher and 
agency cost will be lower. This result is in line with the results found by Singh and 
Davidson (2003). Some authors claim that a higher level of debt can reduce agency 
costs (Zhang and Li, 2008; Ang et al., 2000). However, the contradiction in the 
empirical result could be explained by the various characteristics of the examined 
market because Garanina and Kaikova (2016) indicate that, in US companies, 
higher debt is associated with lower agency costs, but that, in Norwegian 
companies, higher debt is associated with increased agency costs. The Croatian 
market is more similar to the Norwegian than it is to the US market. Growth has 
a significant and negative relationship with asset turnover ratio. This relationship 
indicates that companies with lower growth will have lower agency costs. This 
result contradicts Mendoza and Yelpo (2016) but is similar to Florackis (2008). 
The results indicated a positive but insignificant relationship between ownership 
concentration and asset turnover ratio for Croatian companies. Thus, hypothesis 2 
is not supported. These results conform with those of Junwei et al. (2011) and Aziz 
et al. (2015), which also indicated an insignificant relationship between agency 
costs and ownership concentration. These results could be affected by the fact that 
most of the examined companies have a very high ownership concentration, in 
conformity with the Croatian market.
The main contribution of analysis is to examine if main corporate governance 
mechanisms as debt and boardsize can controlled agency costs and if defined 
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mechanisms are efficient for the principal on the Croatian capital market. Most 
of the present research have been conducted in US and Chine, so the contribution 
of a scientific field is to test how the corporate governance mechanisms effected 
on agency cost for Croatian companies. Also, these results indicate some 
recommendations for the business community that could be implied. First of all, 
when forming the size of the board, have to be taken into account that the results 
indicated that increasing the board reduces its efficiency. In addition, ownership 
concentration in the observed companies did not prove to be an effective corporate 
governance mechanism. This can be explained by the high level of concentration of 
ownership in all these companies.
6. Conclusion 
The results of the analysis show that the paper’s hypotheses are partially supported. 
Some of the indicated results in this paper are not similar to the results of previous 
studies. One of the reasons is that the Croatian market is not similar to those found 
in countries such as the US and the U.K. and has some imperfections. The most 
significant imperfection is low level of market liquidity. The results of prior studies 
of the impact of corporate mechanisms on agency costs are inconsistent because 
their analyses are conducted on markets with different characteristics. These results 
have to consider the aspects of the tradition of corporate governance in Croatia. 
Additionally, a different corporate governance model (the Continental type) is 
dominant in the Croatian market, while most analyses are conducted on the Anglo-
American model. This model characterizes higher ownership concentration, the 
high level of debt financing, lower level of capital market development and low 
level of capital market liquidity. The results indicate the negative impact of board 
size because a larger number of supervisory board members leads to higher agency 
costs. The impact of ownership concentration as a corporate governance mechanism 
is not statistically significant. Prior studies indicated debt as a mechanism for 
decreasing agency costs, but, in our case, debt increases the agency costs. One 
of the control variables, growth, indicates that companies with lower growth 
opportunities will have lower agency costs.
This analysis is limited by the data. The analysis did not include all large companies 
in the Croatian market but only those involved in two main categories of economic 
activity. For a better representative sample of the research population, an analysis 
needs to be done on all large companies engaged in all economic activities. We 
included all large companies from the mentioned economic activities, but because 
of the inability to collect data we had to exclude some companies. In addition, 
the extended period (we collected data for 2014–2018) yields certain results. One 
limitation of the research is that agency costs were approximated through asset 
turnover ratio because such costs are not directly measurable.
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Utjecaj veličine nadzornog odbora i koncentracije vlasništva na troškove 
agenta: Analiza poduzeća u Republici Hrvatskoj
Marina Klačmer Čalopa1, Ivana Đunđek Kokotec2, Karolina Kokot3
Sažetak
Glavni cilj ovog istraživačkog rada je ispitati utjecaj veličine nadzornog odbora i 
koncentracije vlasništva, kao mehanizama korporativnog upravljanja, na troškove 
agenta u velikim hrvatskim poduzećima. Uz to, ispituje se utjecaj financiranja 
dugom i stope rasta poduzeća, varijabli koje također mogu imati utjecaj na 
troškove agenta. Teorija agenta definira okvir za potencijalne probleme koji 
nastaju prilikom razdvajanja vlasništva i upravljanja, kao i za sukob između 
vlasnika (principala) i menadžera (agenta). Najznačajniji problem u navedenom 
odnosu su troškovi agenta, međutim, njih nije moguće izravno mjeriti; sukladno 
tome u ovom istraživanju autori su troškove agenta aproksimirali putem 
koeficijenta obrtaja ukupne imovine. Istraživački rad obuhvaća empirijsko 
testiranje utjecaja veličine nadzornog odbora, koncentracije vlasništva, 
financiranja dugom i stope rasta poduzeća na troškove agenta u promatranom 
razdoblju od 2014. do 2018. pomoću analize panel podataka. Istraživanje je 
provedeno na velikim hrvatskim poduzećima koristeći podatke i informacije iz 
službenih godišnjih financijskih izvješća kako bi se osigurala objektivnost i 
usporedivost podataka. Istraživanjem je obuhvaćeno 219 poduzeća koja posluju u 
sljedećim djelatnostima: prerađivačka industrija (C) i trgovina na veliko i na 
malo; popravak motornih vozila i motocikala (G) sukladno Nacionalnoj 
klasifikaciji djelatnosti. Rezultati analize identificirali su značajan i negativan 
utjecaj veličine nadzornog odbora na troškove agenta. Financiranje dugom i stopa 
rasta imaju značajan i negativan utjecaj na troškove agenta. Istraživanjem nije 
utvrđen značajan utjecaj koncentracija vlasništva na troškove agenta.
Ključne riječi: Troškovi agenta, korporativno upravljanje, nadzorni odbor, 
koncentracija vlasništva, analiza panel podataka
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